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Abstract Some malwares execute operations that de-
termine whether they are running in an analysis envi-
ronment created by monitoring software, such as de-
buggers, sandboxing systems, or virtual machine mon-
itors, and if such an operation nds that the malware
is running in an analysis environment, it terminates
execution to prevent analysis. The existence of mal-
wares that execute such operations (anti-analysis op-
erations) is widely known. However, the knowledge ac-
quired thus far, regarding what proportion of current
malwares execute anti-analysis operations, what types
of anti-analysis operations they execute, and how ef-
fectively such operations prevent analysis, is insu-
cient. In this study, we analyze FFRI Dataset, which
is a dataset of dynamic malware analysis results, and
clarify the trends in the anti-analysis operations exe-
cuted by malware samples collected in 2016. Our nd-
ings revealed that, among 8243 malware samples, 856
(10.4%) samples executed at least one type of the 28
anti-analysis operations investigated in this study. We
also found that, among the virtual machine monitors,
VMware was the most commonly searched for by the
malware samples.
Keywords Malware  virtualization  virtual ma-
chine monitors  hypervisors  anti-analysis  anti-
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1 Introduction
It is widely known that some malwares execute opera-
tions that make it dicult to analyze them. A major
operation involves determining whether the malware is
running in an analysis environment, such as a virtual
machine or debugger, and to prevent execution of the
original operation if the malware is found to be run-
ning in such an analysis environment. This study is
concerned with anti-analysis operations, i.e., counter-
measures adopted by malwares against analyzers.
Many studies have investigated anti-analysis oper-
ations and evasive malwares that behave in consider-
ation of analysis environments. Thus, researchers have
acquired a vast amount of knowledge on malware-side
techniques for detecting the presence of analysis sys-
tems such as virtual machine monitors and debuggers.
Further, it is known that a vulnerability in a virtual
machine monitor can cause a malware running in a vir-
tual machine to escape from it and execute arbitrary
code in the host operating system [1]. Some studies have
presented statistical data on real-world analysis-aware
malwares. For example, in its April 2016 threat report,
Symantec stated that approximately 16% of malwares
are routinely able to detect and identify a virtual ma-
chine environment [2]. Methods for stealth analysis (i.e.,
methods that analyze evasive malware without being
recognized) have also been studied extensively.
However, thus far, to the best of our knowledge,
the following questions have not been answered with
sucient clarity.
{ What proportion of malwares executes a certain
type of anti-analysis operations? What types of anti-
analysis operations do malwares execute frequently,
and what types do they execute rarely?
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{ What virtual machine monitors or sandboxing sys-
tems do malwares attempt to detect?
{ Do malwares execute a combination of multiple anti-
analysis operations or only a single anti-analysis
operation? What is the maximum number of anti-
analysis operations executed by a single malware?
{ Do real-world malwares that execute anti-analysis
operations succeed in the detection of analysis sys-
tems?
We believe that researchers and engineers in this eld
need to gain deeper insights into the above-mentioned
questions to eectively deal with recently developed
malwares, which are becoming increasingly sophisti-
cated.
The objective of this study is to clarify the recent
trends of anti-analysis operations executed by real-world
malwares. In this paper, we report on the results of
analyzing the dynamic behavior log of 8243 samples
of Windows malwares recorded in a malware analysis
dataset, namely FFRI Dataset 2016 [3,4]. This dataset
includes a complete log of Windows API calls invoked
by all the malware processes.
In this paper, we present a case study that addresses
the following points:
{ The proportion of malwares that may become dif-
cult to analyze if an analysis system does not adopt
additional countermeasures against anti-analysis op-
erations
{ The types of anti-analysis operations against which
security systems should preferentially adopt coun-
termeasures
{ The success ratio of each execution of anti-analysis
operations
{ The range of countermeasures needed by an analysis
system to correctly analyze sophisticated malwares
that execute a variety of anti-analysis operations
{ The limitations of an existing dynamic analysis sys-
tem that is widely used
{ Insights that can be obtained only from dynamic
malware analysis logs and insights that are dicult
to obtain only from such logs
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Sect. 2 compares the present study with other related
studies. Sect. 3 describes the anti-analysis operations
targeted in this study. Sect. 4 presents an overview
of the dataset used in this study. Sect. 5 presents the
results of our analysis on malware behavior. Finally,
Sect. 6 summarizes our ndings and briey explores di-
rections for future studies.
2 Related Studies
Numerous studies have been conducted on the tech-
niques by which a program determines the presence or
absence of an analysis system. The studies by Garnkel
et al. [5] and Raetseder et al. [6] provide rich surveys of
existing techniques for the detection of virtual machine
monitors and emulators. In these studies, the authors
have only compared the techniques qualitatively; they
did not clarify which techniques are adopted by actual
malwares or what proportion of malwares execute op-
erations based on each technique. The contribution of
the present study is to present quantitative results that
are useful for such clarications.
Chen et al. [7] evaluated the dierences between
APT-attack malwares and general malwares in terms
of the trends in operations that are aware of debuggers
or virtual machines. Although their study was similar
to the present study in that they analyzed the trends
in anti-analysis operations using many malware sam-
ples, there are also many dierences between the stud-
ies. First, in their study, anti-analysis operations were
detected only through static analysis, while dynamic
behavior was not considered. Moreover, they adopted a
detection standard that is signicantly less precise than
that applied in the present study. For example, they re-
garded a call of the function Sleep as an anti-analysis
operation. Furthermore, their study focused on the dif-
ferences between two classes of malwares and did not
clarify the details of the anti-analysis operations exe-
cuted by malwares.
Kirat et al. [8] proposed MalGene, an automated
technique for extracting the signatures of analysis eva-
sion from system call sequences. Their technique is based
on algorithms used in bioinformatics, data ow analy-
sis, and data mining. In their evaluation of 2810 evasive
malware samples, their system could automatically ex-
tract evasion signatures and classify them into 78 sim-
ilar evasion techniques. It is interesting to apply their
technique to API calls in the dataset we used in the
present study. While their study aimed to develop tech-
niques for analyzing system calls, the present study set
out to uncover the detailed trends in the anti-analysis
operations performed by recently developed real-world
malwares.
Kirat et al. [9] proposed BareCloud, a system for au-
tomatically detecting evasive malware. They reported
that their system could detect 5835 evasive malware
instances out of 110,005 samples. Branco et al. [10] re-
ported on the behavior related to anti-analysis opera-
tions using around four million malware samples. They
showed that a considerable proportion of malwares exe-
cuted these operations. Chubachi et al. [11] also studied
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anti-analysis operations using 89,119 real-world mal-
ware samples, and reported on the number of malware
samples that attempted to detect each artifact of hy-
pervisors or sandboxing systems. They also proposed
SLIME, which is a system for analyzing analysis-aware
malwares by monitoring their instruction execution and
disguising resources checked in anti-analysis operations.
In contrast to the present study, their studies did not
present any extensive statistical data on the operations
executed by the malwares.
Barbosa et al. [12] presented detailed statistical in-
formation on the anti-analysis characteristics of mil-
lions of malware samples. They leveraged static analy-
sis, not dynamic analysis, and hence the class of charac-
teristics they could nd was substantially dierent from
those found in the present study.
Ferrand [13] investigated the internal details of
Cuckoo Sandbox and presented multiple methods by
which it can be detected by malwares. As described
in Sect. 4, FFRI Dataset was created with Cuckoo
Sandbox. Ferrand also presented countermeasures to
prevent detection and enable stealthier analysis with
Cuckoo Sandbox. His work could inuence trends in
real-world malwares with regard to their awareness
of Cuckoo Sandbox and facilitate the development of
Cuckoo's cloaking mechanism against such malwares.
His study and the present study are complementary.
His study accelerated the development of anti-analysis
techniques and stealthy monitoring techniques, whereas
the present study provides a deeper understanding of
the trends in the behavior of real-world malwares de-
veloped on the basis of these techniques.
Chen et al. [14] classied the behaviors of malware
whereby they are aware of virtual machines or debug-
gers and evaluated the dierences in the behavior of
6222 malware samples executed on physical and virtual
machines managed by VMware Server. In contrast to
the present study, they presented experimental results
that included only the proportion of malwares that be-
have dierently on a virtual machine. Moreover, their
study did not concretely clarify the anti-analysis oper-
ations executed by the malwares.
Wang et al. [15] proposed a timing-based technique
called hypervisor introspection, by which a program
running a virtual machine can determine the presence
of introspection operations executed by the hypervisor.
Cardinal Pill Testing [16] is a method for detecting vir-
tual machines through carefully designed tests with re-
gard to CPU instruction semantics. nEther [17] is a
method that detects the Ether Xen-based analysis sys-
tem using both timing information and CPU semantics
information. In contrast to their studies, the present
study focused on the detection of virtualization mech-
anisms without the use of timing information or CPU
instruction information, as described in Sect. 3.
In addition to the above-mentioned studies, many
other studies have examined those methods for analyz-
ing malwares that detect virtualization mechanisms and
evade analysis [18{30]. These studies and the present
study are complementary. We can further improve mal-
ware analysis methods by gaining a deeper understand-
ing of the anti-analysis operations executed by mal-
wares. Conversely, by adopting sophisticated analysis
methods, we can understand malware behavior in greater
detail.
3 Target Anti-Analysis Operations
Through anti-analysis operations, malwares attempt to
nd artifacts of analysis systems such as virtual ma-
chine monitors, sandboxing systems, and debuggers.
Malwares can obtain a variety of information to per-
form anti-analysis operations [5, 6, 10, 13, 16, 17, 31, 32].
Ideally, all such information should be considered in this
study. However, we concentrate on understanding anti-
analysis operations with regard to the following infor-
mation, because this information can be obtained from
Windows API call sequences, which does not necessar-
ily reveal other information:
(1) Computing resources: This refers to the presence,
specication, and contents of computing resources,
including les, folders, registry keys, and hardware
information. Characteristic program les, congu-
ration les, or folders are created in many guest
operating systems running on a virtual machine to
cooperate with the underlying virtual machine mon-
itor. The specication of certain hardware devices,
such as hard disks and network interface cards, also
indicates a particular analysis system.
(2) Co-running programs: This refers to the names of
daemon programs or applications that are simulta-
neously running in the same environment. A debug-
ger process or other monitoring programs may be
running simultaneously with the current process.
(3) Human interface: This refers to activities of human-
interface devices such as a keyboard and mouse.
There tends to be less human-computer interaction
in an articial environment created by an analysis
system. Even if there is any such interaction, it is
likely to be unnatural.
Malwares can attempt to obtain any of the above-mentioned
types of information, any one of which is useful for de-
tecting a virtualization mechanism.
Through anti-analysis operations, malwares can at-
tempt to directly hinder analysis through various means
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including delaying their execution and removing hooks
for function call interception. We also include these op-
erations in the target.
This study does not deal with anti-analysis opera-
tions with regard to the following types of information,
because it is dicult to understand them using FFRI
Dataset:
(4) Values in memory and registers: This refers to a
value stored in the start address of function code,
values stored in special registers, values of particular
ags in the process environment block, and so on.
The start address of function code is often patched
by debuggers to intercept a call. Values in debug
registers and the value of the BeingDebugged ag
in the block indicate whether the current process is
being debugged.
(5) Results of special CPU instructions: This refers to
the execution results of CPU instructions whose be-
havior in a virtual machine diers from that in a
physical machine because of factors such as the omis-
sion of exact instruction emulation by the virtual
machine monitor.
(6) Results of I/O operations: This refers to the exe-
cution results of instructions for operating I/O de-
vices. The behavior of I/O devices in a virtual ma-
chine may dier from that in a real machine.
(7) Performance information: This refers to the time
taken for the execution of a particular operation,
patterns of assigning CPU time to processes, etc.
We exclude (4), (5), and (6) from the target because
FFRI Dataset does not contain execution logs at the
CPU instruction level. Further, it may be possible to
recognize certain types of anti-analysis operations with
regard to (7) because FFRI Dataset associates an in-
vocation time with each Windows API call. However,
we believe that the result will not be useful because
many performance-based anti-analysis operations are
expected be performed by executing CPU instructions,
such as rdtsc, without invoking API calls, and FFRI
Dataset does not contain any instruction-level log. There-
fore, this study does not consider anti-analysis opera-
tions with regard to (7).
4 Dataset
FFRI Dataset [3, 4] is a dataset of dynamic analy-
sis results obtained by executing malwares in Cuckoo
Sandbox [33], which is a widely used open-source sand-
box for malware analysis based on a virtual machine
monitor. Four versions of FFRI Dataset are available
(2013{2016); we choose the latest dataset, namely FFRI
Dataset 2016. This study targets the analysis results of
Table 1 Statistics information
Number of malware samples 8243
Number of child processes created by
0, 0.68, 202
each malware sample (min, ave, max)
Number of API calls invoked by
0, 2721, 82337
each process (min, ave, max)
Total number of API calls 37664465
Number of API functions used by
0, 47.5, 140
each malware sample (min, ave, max)
Total number of API functions 288
8243 malware samples executed on Windows 10 (x64),
which are contained in FFRI Dataset 2016. FFRI, Inc.
collected these malware samples from January 2016 to
March 2016 from all over the world using techniques
such as Web crawling. Further, from these collected
samples, 8243 samples judged as malware by more than
10 anti-virus products were selected. According to the
dataset logs, Cuckoo Sandbox 2.0-dev and VirtualBox
were used to create the dataset.
Cuckoo Sandbox provides a mechanism to compare
program behavior with the characteristics of malware
behavior, which are referred to as signatures. Cuckoo
Sandbox records the signatures detected in the analy-
sis results. Functions for detecting signatures are main-
tained in a source tree called community, which is dis-
tinct from the source tree of the main part of Cuckoo
Sandbox. FFRI Dataset 2016 contains signatures de-
tected by the community code.
In addition, FFRI Dataset contains various types
of information, including data extracted statically from
malware binaries and communication logs created dur-
ing execution. From this set of information, we extract
(1) the signature detection results and (2) the call se-
quences of Windows API invoked by the malwares, and
we analyze the combination of the two.
Table 1 lists the call sequence statistics information
for FFRI Dataset 2016. In the table, min, ave, and max
indicate the minimum, average, and maximum num-
bers, respectively. All the analysis results in the dataset
contain logs of a process for which the program path
is C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe. However, we
excluded the logs from our analysis target because the
process is not derived from a malware.
5 Analysis Results
We analyzed the dynamic analysis logs in FFRI Dataset
2016 using our programs, which transform the logs into
a set of anti-analysis operation logs, and then summa-
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Table 2 Top 20 signatures detected from the malwares
Rank Description by Cuckoo Sandbox
Number and Number and
proportion of proportion of
malware samples malware families
1 File has been identified by at least one AntiVirus on VirusTotal 8243 (100.0%) 3044 (100.0%)
as malicious
2 Performs some HTTP requests 5332 (64.7%) 1976 (64.9%)
3 Allocates read-write-execute memory (usually to unpack itself) 4615 (56.0%) 1791 (58.8%)
4 Generates some ICMP traffic 4162 (50.5%) 1549 (50.9%)
5 One or more potentially interesting buffers were extracted, 2858 (34.7%) 1077 (35.4%)
these generally contain injected code, configuration data, etc.
6 Creates executable files on the filesystem 2214 (26.9%) 748 (24.6%)
7 One or more of the buffers contains an embedded PE file 2116 (25.7%) 758 (24.9%)
8 The executable has PE anomalies (could be a false positive) 2006 (24.3%) 983 (32.3%)
9 Executed a process and injected code into it, probably while 1486 (18.0%) 624 (20.5%)
unpacking
10 Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup 1378 (16.7%) 423 (13.9%)
11 This executable has a PDB path 1091 (13.2%) 387 (12.7%)
12 Collects information to fingerprint the system (MachineGuid, 1029 (12.5%) 334 (11.0%)
DigitalProductId, SystemBiosDate)
13 Code injection with CreateRemoteThread or NtQueueApcThread in a 579 (7.0%) 156 (5.1%)
remote process
14 A process attempted to delay the analysis task. 509 (6.2%) 95 (3.1%)
15 Checks the version of Bios, possibly for anti-virtualization 443 (5.4%) 100 (3.3%)
16 This executable is signed 432 (5.2%) 123 (4.0%)
17 Detects VMWare through the presence of various files 358 (4.3%) 55 (1.8%)
18 Connects to a Dynamic DNS Domain 310 (3.8%) 112 (3.7%)
19 One or more processes crashed 264 (3.2%) 116 (3.8%)
20 Uses Windows utilities for basic Windows functionality 204 (2.5%) 43 (1.4%)
rized them. In this section, we describe the results of
this analysis.
5.1 Detected Signatures
We counted the number of malware samples and mal-
ware families from which the signatures were detected.
We classied the malware samples into those malware
families leveraging malware identication results by anti-
virus products included in the dataset. Although all the
malware samples were examined by at least 36 anti-
virus products, we chose three major ones for the clas-
sication: those identied in the dataset as Microsoft,
Avast, or Malwarebytes. We chose them because anti-
malware market share reports by OPSWAT [34] in 2016
listed them as the top three products with the largest
market shares. We labeled each malware with a con-
catenation of three malware family names assigned by
the three products, and regarded the label as being the
family name of the malware. Among the malware sam-
ples, 418 were not identied as malware by any of the
three products, and so were excluded from the analysis.
We then randomly chose one malware sample from each
malware family and analyzed the logs of the samples.
The number of resulting families was 3044. It should be
noted that dierent signature sets can possibly be de-
tected from dierent malware samples in one malware
family, because their API calls do not necessarily agree
completely.
Table 2 lists the top 20 signatures in descending
order of the number of malware samples from which
the signatures were determined. It also lists the num-
ber of malware families from which the top signatures
were detected. The descriptions of the signatures are
the original descriptions that appear in the analysis
logs of Cuckoo Sandbox. The signatures of the anti-
analysis operations (anti-analysis signatures, hereafter)
are ranked 14, 15, and 17. Although the anti-analysis
signatures are not highly ranked, we regard their num-
bers and proportions as being relatively signicant.
The total number of signatures detected from all
the malware samples was 41,626 (5.05 signatures per
malware on average), while 90 signatures were detected
from at least one malware sample.
Next, we counted the number of anti-analysis sig-
natures detected. Cuckoo Sandbox stores the functions
for detecting each signature in distinct les. In this
study, we regard those les with the prex antidbg ,
antiemu , antisandbox , or antivm as les that con-
tain functions for detecting anti-analysis signatures. Here-
after, we refer to each signature by the name of the le
storing the corresponding detection function.
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Table 3 Numbers of anti-analysis signatures detected from the malwares
Signature name Description by Cuckoo Sandbox
Number and Number and
proportion of proportion of
malware samples malware families
antisandbox sleep A process attempted to delay the analysis task. 509 (6.2%) 95 (3.1%)
antivm generic bios Checks the version of Bios, possibly for 443 (5.4%) 100 (3.3%)
anti-virtualization
antivm vmware files Detects VMWare through the presence of various 358 (4.3%) 55 (1.8%)
files
antivm generic scsi Detects virtualization software with SCSI 113 (1.4%) 68 (2.2%)
Disk Identifier trick(s)
antisandbox forehwnd Checks whether any human activity is being 66 (0.80%) 20 (0.66%)
performed by constantly checking whether ...
antisandbox idletime Looks for the Windows Idle Time to determine 37 (0.45%) 20 (0.66%)
the uptime
antidbg windows Checks for the presence of known windows from 35 (0.42%) 16 (0.53%)
debuggers and forensic tools
antivm vbox keys Detects VirtualBox through the presence of a 34 (0.41%) 24 (0.79%)
registry key
antivm vbox files Detects VirtualBox through the presence of a 29 (0.35%) 15 (0.49%)
file
antivm vmware keys Detects VMWare through the presence of a 14 (0.17%) 7 (0.23%)
registry key
antivm generic disk Queries information on disks, possibly for 11 (0.13%) 7 (0.23%)
anti-virtualization
antisandbox mouse hook Installs an hook procedure to monitor for 7 (0.08%) 5 (0.16%)
mouse events
antivm generic services Enumerates services, possibly for 7 (0.08%) 5 (0.16%)
anti-virtualization
antivm generic firmware Detects Virtual Machines through their custom 2 (0.02%) 1 (0.03%)
firmware
antivm sandboxie Tries to detect Sandboxie 2 (0.02%) 2 (0.07%)
antiemu wine Detects the presence of Wine emulator 1 (0.01%) 1 (0.03%)
antisandbox unhook Tries to unhook Windows functions monitored by 1 (0.01%) 0 (0.00%)
Cuckoo
antivm virtualpc Tries to detect VirtualPC 1 (0.01%) 1 (0.03%)
Table 3 lists the numbers of the anti-analysis sig-
natures detected from the malware samples and mal-
ware families in descending order of the numbers of
malware samples from which the signatures were de-
tected. Among all the signatures of the virtualization
mechanisms, the signatures of VMware and Virtual-
Box were detected from the largest and second-largest
numbers of malware samples, respectively. The signa-
tures of generic operations for detecting virtualization
mechanisms were detected frequently, whereas the sig-
natures of Sandboxie, VirtualPC, and Wine were rarely
detected. Among the signatures of sandboxing systems,
the signature of long sleeps and the signatures for mon-
itoring foreground window and idle time were the most
frequently detected signatures, whereas the signatures
related to hook operations were rarely detected.
We observed nonnegligible changes in the pro-
portions of malware samples, according to whether
we used all the malware samples or only represen-
tative samples of the malware families. The propor-
tion of some signatures such as antisandbox sleep
and antivm vmware files signicantly decreased when
using representative samples. This indicates that the
dataset contained many variants of malware families
from which such signatures were detected. On the
other hand, the proportion of some signatures such
as antivm generic scsi and antivm vbox keys sig-
nicantly increased, indicating that the dataset did
not contain so many variants of malware families from
which such signatures were detected.
Table 4 lists the standards for anti-analysis signa-
ture detection. The descriptions of the standards are
partly abbreviated and simplied owing to space limita-
tions. For example, although the standard for antivm
virtualpc includes pattern matching of the accessed
DLLs and les as well as mutexes, their description is
omitted from the table. For full details on the stan-
dards, readers are encouraged to refer to the script
programs under modules/signatures/windows/ in the
community source tree of Cuckoo Sandbox. Cuckoo Sand-
box detects every anti-analysis signature using the in-
formation available in an API call sequence.
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Table 4 Description of standards for signature detection (partly abbreviated and simplied)
Signature name Detection standard
antidbg windows An argument labeled with window name or class name matches patterns including OLLYDBG
antisandbox forehwnd Both GetForegroundWindow and NtDelayExecution are invoked more than 100 times
antisandbox idletime NtQuerySystemInformation is invoked with argument SystemProcessorPerformanceInformation
antisandbox mouse hook SetWindowsHookExA or SetWindowsHookExW is invoked with specied identier values
antisandbox sleep The total amount of sleep time attempted is  120 s
antisandbox unhook Anomalies such as too many exceptions occur during analysis
antivm generic bios An accessed registry key ends with SystemBiosVersion or VideoBiosVersion
antivm generic disk DeviceIoControl is invoked with argument IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY
antivm generic scsi An accessed registry key matches patterns including ...\\Services\\Disk\\Enum\\0
antivm generic firmware NtQuerySystemInformation is invoked with argument SystemFirmwareTableInformation
antivm generic services EnumServicesStatusA or EnumServicesStatusW is invoked
antivm sandboxie An accessed le or loaded DLL matches ...sbiedll(.dll)?
antivm vbox files An accessed le or loaded DLL matches patterns including VBoxVideo.[a-zA-Z]{3}
antivm vbox keys An accessed registry key ends with \\SOFTWARE\\Oracle\\VirtualBox Guest Additions
antivm virtualpc A mutex whose name matches ...MicrosoftVirtualPC7UserServiceMakeSure... is opened
antivm vmware files An accessed le matches patterns including ...vmmouse.sys, ...vmhgfs.sys, and ...vmci
antivm vmware keys An accessed registry key matches patterns including ...\\(Wow6432Node\\)?VMWare, Inc.
antiemu wine An accessed registry key matches \\HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Wine
 
class VMWareDetectFiles(Signature):
...
files_re = [
".*vmmouse\\.sys", ".*vmhgfs\\.sys",
".*hgfs$", ".*vmci$",
]
def on_complete(self):
for indicator in self.files_re:
for filepath in self.check_file(
pattern=indicator,
regex=True, ...):
self.mark_ioc("file", filepath)
return self.has_marks() 
Fig. 1 Script for detecting an anti-analysis signature related
to VMware (indents are slightly changed)
Figure 1 shows an example script for signature de-
tection, which is extracted from the community source
code. The script program, written in Python, detects
the signature antivm vmware files by comparing le
paths accessed during execution with four regular ex-
pressions that represent characteristic le paths usu-
ally employed in a guest operating system running on
VMware. Cuckoo Sandbox records the accessed le paths
and nally calls the function on complete after the en-
tire execution. This function performs pattern match-
ing against each of the recorded paths and marks the
analysis result with an indicator of compromise (IOC)
if at least one le path matches with one of the regular
expressions.
The community source code that is expected to be
used to create the dataset includes 28 anti-analysis
signatures (i.e., 28 signatures that are categorized by
Cuckoo developers as anti-debug, anti-emulation,
anti-sandbox, or anti-vm). Although the following 10
signatures are provided in the community code in ad-
dition to the 18 signatures listed in Table 3, they were
not detected from any malware samples in the dataset:
antidbg devices, antisandbox file,
antisandbox sunbelt, antivm generic ide,
antivm vbox acpi, antivm vbox devices,
antivm vbox window, antivm virtualpc magic,
antivm vmware in insn, shutdown
Although the community source code as of August
12, 2016, additionally provides the following seven sig-
natures, none of them was detected as might be ex-
pected:
antivm bochs keys, antivm computername,
antivm generic cpu, antivm hyperv keys,
antivm parallels keys, antivm vpc keys,
antivm xen keys
Because these seven signatures are not expected to have
been introduced into the environment for dataset cre-
ation, Cuckoo Sandbox did not detect any signature
related to Bochs, Hyper-V, Parallels, or Xen. Hence,
we attempted to nd these new signatures by apply-
ing their detection standard to the dataset. Neverthe-
less, none of these signatures was detected. However,
we found that remarkable strings, such as Hyper-V and
microsoft-hyper-v, appeared in the arguments of many
API calls. Thus, we did not exclude the possibility that
some of the malware samples attempt to recognize Hyper-
V.
Next, we examined how many signatures were de-
tected from each malware sample and each malware
family. Table 5 shows the results obtained when count-
ing all the signatures, not only the anti-analysis ones.
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Table 5 Number of signatures detected from each malware
sample or each malware family
Number of
signatures
Number and Number and
proportion of proportion of
malware samples malware families
0 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%)
1 724 (8.8%) 241 (7.9%)
2 923 (11.2%) 322 (10.6%)
3 1548 (18.8%) 540 (17.7%)
4 1103 (13.4%) 399 (13.1%)
5 880 (10.7%) 369 (12.1%)
6 848 (10.3%) 348 (11.4%)
7 570 (6.9%) 242 (8.0%)
8 520 (6.3%) 235 (7.7%)
9 348 (4.2%) 126 (4.1%)
10 213 (2.6%) 74 (2.4%)
11 159 (1.9%) 57 (1.9%)
12 158 (1.9%) 41 (1.3%)
13 97 (1.2%) 20 (0.66%)
14 96 (1.2%) 19 (0.62%)
15 47 (0.60%) 9 (0.30%)
16 8 (0.10%) 2 (0.07%)
17 1 (0.01%) 0 (0.00%)
 18 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%)
The maximum and minimum number of signatures de-
tected from one malware sample was 17 and 1, respec-
tively. This result indicates that some \active" mal-
wares conduct a large block of operations that are deter-
mined as signatures. The malware sample from which
17 signatures were detected will be elaborated as Mal-
ware 1 in Sect. 5.6. The maximum number of signatures
detected from one representative sample of a malware
family was 16, not 17, because the above-mentioned
malware sample (Malware 1) was not chosen as a rep-
resentative from the corresponding family. We did not
nd a large dierence in the distribution of the number
of signatures between when using all the malware sam-
ples and when using samples that are representative of
a family.
Table 6 lists the results obtained when counting
anti-analysis signatures only. In the same way as with
the previous results, we did not nd a large dierence
in the distribution between when using all the malware
samples and when using samples that are representative
of a family. At least one anti-analysis signature was de-
tected from the execution of around 10.4% of the mal-
ware samples. In general, only a few anti-analysis sig-
natures were detected from one malware sample. More
than three anti-analysis signatures were detected from
only around 0.15% of all the malware samples. Further,
more than four anti-analysis signatures were detected
from only ve out of the 8243 samples. This result indi-
cates that only a small proportion of malwares execute
a wide range of anti-analysis operations.
Table 6 Number of anti-analysis signatures detected from
each malware sample or each malware family
Number of Number and Number and
anti-analysis proportion of proportion of
signatures malware samples malware families
0 7387 (89.6%) 2791 (91.7%)
1 416 (5.0%) 151 (5.0%)
2 83 (1.0%) 26 (0.85%)
3 345 (4.2%) 69 (2.3%)
4 7 (0.08%) 3 (0.10%)
5 5 (0.06%) 4 (0.13%)
 6 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%)
We examined each of the ve malware samples from
which ve anti-analysis signatures were detected. The
signatures antivm generic bios, antivm generic
scsi, antivm vbox keys, and antivm vmware keys
were detected from all these samples. As the remain-
ing signature, antidbg windows was detected from two
malware samples and antisandbox sleep was detected
from three malware samples.
5.2 Programs that Execute Anti-Analysis Operations
Some malwares create a new process during their execu-
tion. Anti-analysis operations may be executed by the
rst process of a malware or by a child process created
during the execution.
Some child processes can execute a downloaded ma-
licious program, while others can simply execute a be-
nign program to help the main process of the malware.
In addition, some child processes can rst execute a
benign program and then become targets of shellcode
injection, which is typically achieved with the function
CreateRemoteThread. As shown in Table 2, the signa-
ture of code injection into a remote process was de-
tected from 579 malware samples.
We examined the names of the programs from which
an anti-analysis signature was detected, and counted
the number of API calls for anti-analysis operations in-
voked by each of the programs (including both success-
ful and unsuccessful calls). We also counted the number
of processes from which an anti-analysis signature was
detected.
We excluded the signatures antisandbox forehwnd
and antisandbox sleep from this result because the
numbers of API calls for these anti-analysis operations
are not meaningful.
Tables 7 and 8 show the results. Each malware le
in FFRI Dataset 2016 is named as \the SHA-1 hash
value of the le content".exe. The tables show only
high-ranked programs in terms of the total number of
API calls. After these programs, the ranking continues
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Table 7 Number of API calls invoked for anti-analysis operations
antivm antivm antivm antivm anti antivm antivm antivm
Program name Sum generic debug vmware generic sandbox vbox vbox vmware Others
bios windows files scsi idletime keys files keys
Hashvalue.exe 3019 436 1375 17 457 526 86 48 20 54
explorer.exe 1916 1104 708 38 1 15 27 11 12
hh.exe 189 84 69 21 15
helppane.exe 144 64 50 16 14
regedit.exe 127 56 2 41 14 14
bfsvc.exe 62 28 26 7 1
powershell.exe 62 62
notepad.exe 57 24 24 3 6
write.exe 54 24 24 6
iesecure.exe 52 26 26
Table 8 Number of processes from which an anti-analysis signature was detected
antivm antivm antivm antivm anti antivm antivm antivm
Program name Sum generic debug vmware generic sandbox vbox vbox vmware Others
bios windows files scsi idletime keys files keys
Hashvalue.exe 383 84 40 13 110 31 34 29 15 27
explorer.exe 734 357 354 3 1 3 9 1 6
hh.exe 13 4 4 4 1
helppane.exe 7 2 2 2 1
regedit.exe 9 2 1 2 2 2
bfsvc.exe 13 4 4 4 1
powershell.exe 5 5
notepad.exe 10 3 3 1 3
write.exe 9 3 3 3
iesecure.exe 26 13 13
with splwow64.exe, winhlp32.exe, eventvwr.exe,
verifiergui.exe, 1.exe, MicrosoftTray.exe, M.exe,
Sdat.exe, kernel21.exe, and diskchk.exe. All these
programs invoked less than 20 API calls for anti-
analysis operations. Moreover, the tables show only
high-ranked signatures in terms of the total numbers
of API calls.
The result indicates that anti-analysis operations
are often executed by the rst process of a malware as
well as by other processes. All programs except hash-
value programs in the tables are utilities provided by
the operating systems. These utilities could invoke anti-
analysis operations for benign purposes, or shellcode
injected into these utilities could invoke anti-analysis
operations for malicious purposes.
Signatures of generic anti-analysis operations and
signatures related to the registry keys of virtual ma-
chine monitors were detected from a wide range of pro-
grams. The other signatures were detected from only
a small number of programs. A strong correlation was
observed between powershell.exe and antisandbox
idletime as well as among explorer.exe, iesecure.
exe, and signatures related to the les of virtual ma-
chine monitors.
5.3 Discussion on Individual Signatures
5.3.1 Overview
To determine whether the malwares succeeded in anti-
analysis operations, we examined the number of suc-
cessful and unsuccessful API calls that match each anti-
analysis signature. We counted the number by compar-
ing the standards used by Cuckoo Sandbox for signa-
ture detection with the function names and argument
values of all API calls invoked by malwares from which
an anti-analysis signature was detected. Cuckoo Sand-
box ignores some unsuccessful API calls that match an
anti-analysis signature. However, in this study, we count
and report the numbers of both successful and unsuc-
cessful calls because the purpose of this study is to un-
derstand as much anti-analysis behavior of malwares as
possible. We determined the success and failure of each
API call based on the return value, the NTSTATUS er-
ror code, and the specication of the API function. Al-
though some API functions are exceptional, a call is de-
termined to be a failure if the return value or NTSTATUS
is negative, and a success otherwise.
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Table 9 Success and failure of API calls for anti-analysis
operations
Number of Number of
Signature name successful unsuccessful
calls calls
antisandbox sleep | |
antivm generic bios 1503 345
antivm vmware files 0 751
antivm generic scsi 745 0
antisandbox forehwnd | |
antisandbox idletime 587 5
antidbg windows 0 1379
antivm vbox keys 0 174
antivm vbox files 0 101
antivm vmware keys 0 76
antivm generic disk 25 0
antisandbox mouse hook 6 2
antivm generic services 7 7
antivm generic firmware 10 6
antivm sandboxie 0 3
antiemu wine 0 2
antisandbox unhook | |
antivm virtualpc 0 1
Table 9 shows the result. The numbers of some
anti-analysis operations are not lled in the table be-
cause the numbers do not indicate the number of
these anti-analysis operations. All calls of anti-analysis
operations related to virtualization mechanisms (i.e.,
antivm vmware *, antivm vbox *, antivm sandboxie,
antiemu wine, and antivm virtualpc) failed. On the
other hand, all calls of generic anti-analysis operations
that check disk information (antivm generic scsi
and antivm generic disk) were successful. The calls
of generic anti-analysis operations that check the
BIOS version (antivm generic bios) included success-
ful and unsuccessful ones. The calls of generic anti-
analysis operations that check the rmware informa-
tion and enumerate the services (antivm generic
firmware and antivm generic services) were all suc-
cessful practically, as described later in detail. In the
following subsections, we explain the details of malware
behavior related to each anti-analysis signature.
5.3.2 Sleeps
Some malwares sleep to delay analysis; thus, Cuckoo
Sandbox regards a large amount of accumulative sleep
time as a signature. It calculates the sum of the times
given as arguments of NtDelayExecution and com-
pares the sum with a threshold.
This signature was detected from the largest num-
ber of malware samples among all the signatures. For
this signature, the number of related API calls is not
meaningful because only the total amount of sleep time
matters.
A long sleep is easy to implement and eectively
hinders analysis. Hence, this signature was naturally
detected from many malware samples. However, it is
important to note that not all long sleeps are neces-
sarily intended for anti-analysis operations; some mal-
wares might sleep for other purposes, such as waiting
for communication.
5.3.3 BIOS Version Checks
Many virtual machine monitors provide an inherent vir-
tual BIOS. The BIOS version information enables mal-
wares to determine the presence and identify the name
of an underlying virtual machine monitor, if any, with
high accuracy.
In general, the BIOS version information is used
for various purposes besides anti-analysis operations.
Hence, BIOS version checks executed by a program do
not immediately imply that the program attempts to
detect artifacts of a virtual machine monitor. Actually,
Cuckoo Sandbox describes the signature with a sub-
tle expression, possibly for anti-virtualization.
Similar expressions are used to describe signatures of
antivm generic disk and antivm generic services.
API calls that match these signatures are not necessar-
ily for anti-analysis operations.
The signature of BIOS version checks was de-
tected from 443 malware samples. Success or fail-
ure of the calls was dependent solely on an ac-
cessed registry key. Accesses to keys located un-
der HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\HARDWARE were successful,
whereas accesses to keys located under HKEY_LOCAL_
MACHINE\\SOFTWARE failed. Successful calls received
the string LENOVO - 2020 or LENOVO - 3220 for the
registry key SystemBiosVersion, and they received
the string Hardware Versio for the registry key
VideoBiosVersion.
Cuckoo Sandbox returns spurious BIOS informa-
tion that diers from the information on the physical
BIOS. For SystemBiosVersion, it randomly chooses
one of the two above-mentioned strings and re-
turns it. For VideoBiosVersion, it returns the string
Hardware Version 0.0. Because the strings are pub-
licly available, it is not dicult to write a program that
determines whether it is running in Cuckoo Sandbox. It
is possible for some malware samples attempting to rec-
ognize Cuckoo Sandbox with this operation to correctly
determine the presence of Cuckoo Sandbox.
5.3.4 Detection of Virtual Machine Monitors
The malwares in the dataset failed in all API calls for
detecting virtual machine monitors. Conversely, they
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were successful in most attempts to correctly predict
the absence of virtual machine monitors. The malwares
naturally failed in opening les or registry keys related
to VMware because the running environment was built
with VirtualBox. A signature of operations for recog-
nizing VirtualPC was detected only once from a call
to the function NtCreateMutant with the argument
MicrosoftVirtualPC7UserServiceMakeSureWe'reThe
OnlyOneMutex. This call also failed, and the failure is
natural for the same reason as that stated above. All
attempts to open les or registry keys related to Virtu-
alBox also failed because resources related to Virtual-
Box Guest Additions were not found in the guest OS.
Cuckoo Sandbox uses accesses to les of VirtualBox
Guest Additions as a detection standard of signatures
related to VirtualBox; all such le accesses failed in the
execution recorded in the dataset.
5.3.5 Detection of Sandboxie and Wine
Sandboxie is not a virtual machine monitor but soft-
ware that creates a virtual environment in the operat-
ing system for running untrusted programs. Operations
onto resources, such as les, performed in a virtual envi-
ronment are applied to virtualized counterparts and do
not aect the real resources. Signatures related to Sand-
boxie were detected from two malware samples. One of
them invokes the function LdrLoadDll twice with the
Sandboxie library SbieDll.dll as an argument. The
other invokes the function NtCreateMutant only once
with Sandboxie SingleInstanceMutex Control as an
argument. All the calls failed.
The signature related to Wine, which is a Win-
dows emulator, was detected from one malware sam-
ple. The malware accessed the registry key HKEY_
CURRENT_USER\\Software\\WINE twice with the func-
tion RegOpenKeyExW, and it failed in both accesses.
The malwares naturally failed in all API calls re-
lated to the Sandboxie and Wine signatures because it
is highly unlikely that either Sandboxie or Wine was
installed in the environment.
5.3.6 Checks of Disk Hardware Information
Many virtual machine monitors provide inherent vir-
tual disk hardware to virtual machines. Disk hardware
information is a critical clue for judging whether the
running environment is a virtual one. Cuckoo Sandbox
detects the signature antivm generic scsi from API
calls for accessing registry keys of SCSI device identi-
ers or disk services. In general, these keys maintain
data for the identication of disk hardware, such as
product numbers.
Cuckoo Sandbox provides a mechanism called \VM
cloaking", in which spurious hardware and software in-
formation is provided to virtual machines to deceive
malware. Specically, when the original value of a SCSI
device registry contains a predened substring such as
vbox, vmware, qemu, or virtual, Cuckoo Sandbox re-
places the value with a random character string or with
the string ST9160411AS, which represents a Seagate
hard disk. The string ST9160411AS appeared in the ar-
gument strings of 33 malware samples in the dataset.
The signature antivm generic disk was de-
tected from various API calls, which include
NtCreateFile calls with le paths containing the
substring physicaldrive0 or scsi0. They also include
DeviceIoControl calls with special control code. All
API calls for operations related to these signatures
were successful. If some malware samples in the
dataset determined the presence of virtualization
mechanisms using disk hardware information, they
might have correctly judged that they were running
in a virtual environment. As described above, some
malware samples actually obtained publicly available
information that Cuckoo Sandbox provides to disguise
environments.
5.3.7 Checks of Human Activity
Some malwares attempt to detect the character-
istic behavior related to human activity in order
to identify whether the running environment is a
sandbox for analysis. Cuckoo Sandbox supports the
signatures of such behavior, namely antisandbox
forehwnd, antisandbox idletime, and antisandbox
mouse hook.
For antisandbox forehwnd, Cuckoo Sandbox
makes a decision based on the number of calls
by malwares to GetForegroundWindow, which is
a function for obtaining the handle of the fore-
ground window, and NtDelayExecution, which is
a function for sleeping. In general, changes in the
foreground window indicate human activity. Many
malware samples in the dataset repeatedly invoked
GetForegroundWindow and NtDelayExecution
numerous times. We counted the maximum and
average numbers of GetForegroundWindow calls and
NtDelayExecution calls invoked by malwares from
which the signature antisandbox forehwnd was
detected. The maximum and average numbers of
GetForegroundWindow calls were 9960 and 1040,
respectively, while the maximum and average numbers
of NtDelayExecution calls were 5172 and 1067,
respectively.
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For antisandbox idletime, Cuckoo Sandbox looks
for API calls to determine the amount of time for
which the system has been idle. In general, a long idle
time indicates a long uptime, and a long uptime indi-
cates an ordinary environment not intended for mal-
ware analysis. Most API calls for operations related to
antisandbox idletime were successful, and only ve
calls were unsuccessful. All the unsuccessful calls were
caused by insucient buer sizes. Immediately after
each of the unsuccessful calls, the malwares invoked the
same API function again and succeeded in it.
For antisandbox mouse hook, Cuckoo Sandbox
looks for attempts by the malwares to intercept mouse
events. Six calls for operations related to this signature
were successful and two were unsuccessful. The unsuc-
cessful calls were caused by invalid code addresses given
to arguments. It is not straightforward to determine
whether the malware samples that executed the suc-
cessful calls recognized the analysis environment, be-
cause Cuckoo Sandbox automatically moves the mouse
cursor and clicks mouse buttons in a virtual machine
to disguise the virtual machine as an ordinary environ-
ment.
The signature antisandbox forehwnd was detected
frequently compared to the other anti-analysis sig-
natures. Further, antisandbox idletime was also
detected relatively frequently. On the other hand,
antisandbox mouse hook was detected from only a few
malware samples. We surmise from this result that mal-
ware developers prefer obscure anti-analysis operations,
such as simply reading system information, rather than
conspicuous operations, such as inserting hooks into
API calls.
5.3.8 Checks of Debuggers and Forensic Tools
Some malwares check for the presence of win-
dows from debuggers and forensic tools in the
running environment. Cuckoo Sandbox detects the
signature antidbg windows from API calls whose
argument labeled with window name or class
name matches strings that characterize debuggers
and forensic tools. The strings include OLLYDBG,
WinDbgFrameClass, FilemonClass, and Registry
Monitor - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com.
The malware samples in the dataset invoked 1379
API calls for operations related to this signature. All of
them were calls of either FindWindowA or FindWindowW,
which are functions for nding a window with a class
name and window name that matches given argument
strings. All 1379 calls failed because none of the searched
windows existed in the environment. Hence, the mal-
wares were likely to judge that no debugger or forensic
tool was running, which is consistent with the facts.
A well-known method for a malware to check
whether it is being debugged is calling the function
IsDebuggerPresent. However, Cuckoo Sandbox does
not have any signature detection standard based on
the call of this function. Although many malware sam-
ples in the dataset called IsDebuggerPresent, Cuckoo
Sandbox simply ignored the calls. The number of
malwares that called the function at least once was
2900, and the total number of calls was 4559, out of
which 4555 failed and only four were successful. All
the successful calls were invoked by the second pro-
cess that was dynamically created by the rst mal-
ware process. The memory of the second process was
read and written by the rst process with the func-
tions ReadProcessMemory and WriteProcessMemory,
respectively.
5.3.9 Enumeration of Services
The signature antivm generic services is de-
tected from calls of API functions whose prex is
EnumServiceStatus. These functions enumerate the
currently running services. The presence of particular
services indicates the presence of analysis software.
This signature was detected from only two malware
samples, and only 14 API calls were invoked for op-
erations related to this signature. Among the 14 calls,
seven calls were successful and the other seven calls
were unsuccessful. However, the unsuccessful calls were
only for returning the error code ERROR MORE DATA,
which represents the continuation of data. Hence, prac-
tically, all attempts by the malwares for the operations
were successful. It is considered that the malwares suc-
cessfully recognized the services running in the operat-
ing system.
5.3.10 Checks of Firmware Information
The signature for checking rmware information,
namely antivm generic firmware, was detected from
only two malware samples, and only 16 API calls
were invoked for operations related to the sig-
nature. Both malware samples called the func-
tion NtQuerySystemInformation with the argument
SystemFirmwareTableInformation, and the signature
was detected from these calls. Among the 16 calls, 10
calls were successful and six calls were unsuccessful. All
the unsuccessful calls were caused by insucient buer
sizes for storing the results. Immediately after the un-
successful calls, the malwares called the same function
again, and these second attempts were all successful.
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Hence, the malwares successfully obtained the rmware
information in all attempts of the operations.
5.4 Whether the Malwares Recognized Virtualization
We consider that only a few malware samples from the
dataset recognized Cuckoo Sandbox because many mal-
ware samples did not terminate themselves and contin-
ued their execution long after the anti-analysis opera-
tions. We examined the position of the last successful
API call for operations related to each anti-analysis sig-
nature in the API call sequence of each malware pro-
cess. Table 10 shows the average positions. Here, the
position of a call in a sequence indicates the order of
the call (smaller is earlier) divided by the number of
calls contained in the sequence. In addition, the table
also shows the average number of subsequent API calls
invoked after the last successful call until process ter-
mination. If a malware was programmed to terminate
its execution immediately after the successful detection
of an analysis system, API calls for anti-analysis oper-
ations would be observed in the nal stage of the call
sequence. However, API calls for anti-analysis opera-
tions were not actually observed in such stage. More-
over, the malwares executed more API calls than the
expected number required in a termination operation
(i.e., 100 calls). From the viewpoint of not only the
relative positions but also the absolute numbers of calls,
it is reasonable to assume that a majority of the mal-
wares did not successfully detect Cuckoo Sandbox and
terminate execution.
We also conducted a microscopic examination of
whether the malwares recognized Cuckoo Sandbox. We
investigated the behavior observed after the last suc-
cessful API call described above. Because some sophis-
ticated malwares execute dummy or misleading opera-
tions after they had detected an analysis system [35],
the behavior of API calls, as well as their numbers
and positions, should be considered. The targets of
the investigation were malware samples from which the
signature antisandbox mouse hook, antivm generic
disk, antivm generic firmware, or antivm generic
services was detected. We chose these targets because
of the small numbers of the samples. We found that 24
out of 28 malwares attempted at least one of the fol-
lowing operations: le write, registry key write, process
creation, network communication to the external net-
work, and thread creation in another process. These op-
erations are mainly used for malicious purposes. These
24 malware samples are expected to continue malicious
operations because they did not or could not detect
Cuckoo Sandbox. The remaining four malware sam-
Table 10 Average relative positions of the last successful
API call related to an anti-analysis operation and average
numbers of API calls invoked after the last API call
Signature name
Position of Number of
last call subsequent calls
antivm generic bios 21.6% 2865
antivm generic scsi 69.2% 1353
antisandbox idletime 84.2% 1049
antivm generic disk 37.7% 8125
antisandbox mouse hook 31.0% 301
antivm generic firmware 44.7% 524
antivm generic services 19.6% 300
ples terminated themselves without executing opera-
tions that can be regarded as malicious.
5.5 Overlooked Behavior
No security software can possibly detect all types of
anti-analysis operations. In fact, FFRI Dataset 2016
contains numerous signs of anti-analysis operations that
seem to be overlooked by Cuckoo Sandbox. Here, we
briey describe several reasons for such oversight that
we consider important.
{ Arguments of some API functions are not checked
even though they should be. For example, Cuckoo
Sandbox does not scan the arguments of the func-
tion LdrGetDllHandle; consequently, it ignored sev-
eral characteristic strings that appeared in the argu-
ments of LdrGetDllHandle in FFRI Dataset 2016.
Examples include sbiedll.dll (a library le of
Sandboxie) and api log.dll (a library le of Sun-
Belt Sandbox).
{ Pattern matching of les and registry keys is not
exhaustive. For example, although some malwares
attempted to open the le vmmemctl, which is a le
used by VMware, Cuckoo Sandbox ignored them
owing to the lack of a pattern for signature detection
that matches the le name.
{ Arguments of unsuccessful calls of some API func-
tions are not checked. For example, the arguments
of the function NtCreateFile are excluded from the
target of pattern matching if the call fails. The ar-
guments of unsuccessful calls are simply ignored. As
a result, Cuckoo Sandbox ignored many operations
that were considered highly likely to be anti-analysis
operations. Further, it ignored all arguments con-
taining a string that characterizes a virtual machine
monitor, such as VBoxGuest. We consider that in-
vocation attempts of API calls matching the pat-
terns themselves should be detected as signatures,
regardless of whether they are successful, because
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analysis systems should enable malware analysts to
keep track of all attempts of anti-analysis opera-
tions exhaustively. Providing dierent signatures to
successful anti-analysis operations and unsuccessful
ones may further facilitate malware analysis.
5.6 Behavior of Individual Malwares
The following paragraphs describe the behavior of sev-
eral remarkable malware samples.
Malware 1 (Hash Value 8a127994...): The number of
signatures detected from this malware sample (17) was
the largest among all the malware samples. The de-
tected signatures include four anti-analysis signatures,
namely antisandbox idletime, antisandbox sleep,
antivm generic bios, and antivm vmware files. Af-
ter the anti-analysis operations, this malware sample
attempted to execute a wide range of operations in-
cluding network communication and did not show the
behavior of immediate termination.
Malware 2 (Hash Value bef62f27...): The behavior of
this malware sample is rare in the sense that this is one
of two malware samples from which the signature re-
lated to Sandboxie was detected, one of two malware
samples from which the signature related to rmware
information checks was detected, and the only malware
sample from which the signature related to Wine was
detected. This malware sample attempted to open sev-
eral characteristic les such as VBoxGuest, HGFS, and
vmci with the function NtCreateFile. We regard these
as being highly likely to be anti-analysis operations
for detecting VirtualBox or VMware. However, Cuckoo
Sandbox ignored the open operations for the reason de-
scribed in Sect. 5.5. In addition, this malware sample
executed many apparently anti-analysis operations. For
example, it checked the free disk space, the number of
processors, and the location of the mouse cursor. It in-
voked the API function GetCursorPos as many as 5816
times.
Malware 3 (Hash Value f6772412...): Rare signatures
including rmware information checks, Sandboxie de-
tection, and VirtualPC detection were detected from
this malware sample. This malware sample immediately
began to terminate itself after the execution of these
anti-analysis operations. Here, it should be noted that
this malware failed to detect Sandboxie or VirtualPC.
Hence, if this malware terminated execution because
of being analyzed, the detection of the analysis was
likely to be caused by another information source, such
as rmware or performance. Thus far, it has not been
determined whether the termination is because of the
detection of Cuckoo Sandbox. Therefore, further inves-
tigation based on other information, such as malware
bodies and executed instruction sequences, is required.
This malware sample also executed other interesting op-
erations, although they were not reported as signatures.
For example, it obtained the number of CPUs with
the function GetNativeSystemInfo, obtained the cur-
sor position periodically every 100 ms, and attempted
to open a folder named C:\\Sandbox.
6 Summary and Future Work
We reported the trends of anti-analysis operations ex-
ecuted by recently developed malwares whose dynamic
behavior was recorded in FFRI Dataset 2016. Our nd-
ings can be summarized as follows:
{ Among 8243 malware samples, 856 (10.4%) samples
executed at least one type of the 28 anti-analysis op-
erations investigated in this study. Most of them ex-
ecuted only one, two, or three types of anti-analysis
operations. No malware sample executed more than
ve types of anti-analysis operations.
{ VMware was the virtual machine monitor that the
largest number of malware samples was aware of.
VirtualBox was in the next position. Behavior re-
lated to Bochs, Hyper-V, Parallels, and Xen was not
detected probably because the signatures of the be-
havior had not been incorporated in Cuckoo Sand-
box when the dataset was created. We found that
the dataset contains many API calls whose argu-
ment strings are related to Hyper-V.
{ Anti-analysis operations were often executed by
the rst process of a malware by itself. They
were also executed with nonnegligible frequency by
child processes created by the malware. Further,
explorer.exe, hh.exe, and helppane.exe were the
top three Windows programs running in child pro-
cesses that executed the largest number of anti-
analysis operations.
{ We surmise that the malwares failed in all attempts
to detect a virtual machine monitor by accessing in-
dividual les or registry keys. Conversely, they were
successful in most attempts to correctly predict the
absence of virtual machine monitors. On the other
hand, thus far, it has not been determined whether
the malwares could successfully detect virtual ma-
chine monitors using hardware information or ser-
vice information.
{ Some malware samples obtained hardware informa-
tion and then terminated themselves without exe-
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cuting any operation with the original purpose of
the malware.
{ Cuckoo Sandbox ignored some operations that were
likely to be anti-analysis operations. One reason for
this oversight is that the patterns of functions and
arguments for signature detection are not exhaus-
tive. Another reason is that Cuckoo Sandbox ignores
arguments of some unsuccessful calls.
These are the trends observed only in FFRI Dataset
2016, which was collected with Cuckoo Sandbox 2.0-
dev. Further investigation is needed to determine
whether these trends are universal ones that are also
observed when analyzing a general set of recently devel-
oped malwares and when using other analysis systems.
There are several directions for future work. First,
future studies are expected to clarify malware behav-
ior that cannot be understood with only API call se-
quences. An extremely important example of the behav-
ior is time-based detection of analysis systems. It would
be necessary to combine the insights of the present
study with those obtained by analyzing performance
data or a trace of executed CPU instructions. Second,
it would be necessary to develop a method capable of
more accurately predicting whether and when malwares
successfully detect the presence of analysis systems. Al-
though some malware samples in the dataset nished
their execution without performing any malicious op-
erations, the reasons for their behavior have not been
fully identied. Moreover, sophisticated malwares in the
dataset might possibly execute dummy or misleading
operations after the detection of analysis systems [35].
One starting point for future work will be to gain a full
understanding of the behavior observed around the last
execution of anti-analysis operations.
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